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Abstract 
Flight efficiency and reduction of flight delays 
are among the primary goals of NextGen. In this 
paper, we propose a concept of shared airspace where 
departures fly across arrival flows, provided gaps are 
available in these flows. We have explored solutions 
to separate departures temporally from arrival traffic 
and pre-arranged procedures to support controllers’ 
decisions. We conducted a Human-in-the-Loop 
simulation and assessed the efficiency and safety of 
96 departures from the San Jose airport (SJC) 
climbing across the arrival airspace of the Oakland 
and San Francisco arrival flows. In our simulation, 
the SJC tower had a tool to schedule departures to fly 
across predicted gaps in the arrival flow. When 
departures were mistimed and separation could not be 
ensured, a safe but less efficient route was provided 
to the departures to fly under the arrival flows. A 
coordination using a point-out procedure allowed the 
arrival controller to control the SJC departures right 
after takeoff. We manipulated the accuracy of 
departure time (accurate vs. inaccurate) as well as 
which sector took control of the departures after 
takeoff (departure vs. arrival sector) in a 2x2 full 
factorial plan. Results show that coordination time 
decreased and climb efficiency increased when the 
arrival sector controlled the aircraft right after 
takeoff. Also, climb efficiency increased when the 
departure times were more accurate. Coordination 
was shown to be a critical component of tactical 
operations in shared airspace. Although workload, 
coordination, and safety were judged by controllers 
as acceptable in the simulation, it appears that in the 
field, controllers would need improved tools and 
coordination procedures to support this procedure. 
Introduction 
Today in terminal environments, arrival and 
departure flows are decoupled and assigned to 
distinct arrival and departure sectors. This spatial 
segregation avoids interactions and procedurally 
provides for separation between aircraft. This results 
in safe but inefficient routes in places where efficient 
routes would otherwise overlap. 
In metroplex environments, efficiency and 
delays can be further compromised by the density 
and complexity of operations. Metroplex is defined 
by the Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO) as an area with high traffic demand served by 
two or more airports with arrival and departure 
operations that are highly interdependent [1]. 
Metroplex interdependencies stem from different 
traffic flows sharing common fixes, paths or airspace 
volumes within the metroplex airspace. [2]. These 
interdependencies can be coordinated by either 
separating traffic across space or separating traffic 
across time. When traffic uses the same volume of 
airspace, it can be separated laterally, vertically, or 
temporally. When traffic uses the same lateral point, 
it can be separated vertically or temporally.  
These types of separation are control strategies 
that have different costs and benefits. Spatial 
separation decouples traffic demand and relies less on 
the precision of when aircraft cross a given point. 
However, having distinct routes in segregated 
airspaces reduces airspace capacity. Routes may be 
longer and require altitude constraints to 
accommodate other routes and sectors, which also 
results in fuel and time inefficiencies. For controllers, 
the division of airspace spatially reduces traffic 
complexity. It clearly divides tasks and 
responsibilities between controllers. But this division 
has a cost when interdependencies exist between 
controllers. In current control facilities, Letters Of 
Agreement and Standard Operating Procedures 
regulate coordination needs between sectors.  
Temporal separation involves dealing with 
multiple traffic demands and coordinating the use of 
shared resources, e.g., common fixes and runways. 
Today it is mostly used to space or merge traffic to a 
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common destination or to intersecting runways. 
Temporal separation optimizes the use of airspace by 
accommodating multiple interdependent demands, 
but it also requires precision in timing. Temporal 
separation can be managed on a first-come first-
served basis, but it is not an efficient strategy to 
manage multiple conflicting demands or high traffic 
density. The use of shared resources can be exceeded 
by high demand and create choke points. Temporal 
separation can therefore benefit from scheduling 
technology [3, 4].  
At NASA Ames Research Center, the Airspace 
System Project aims at developing scheduling and 
automation technologies for complex operational 
choke points in metroplex airspace. One of the 
objectives is to develop concepts and technologies to 
maximize performance for interacting arrival and 
departure operations. Recent modeling studies at 
NASA Ames have shown that the hybrid use of 
spatial and temporal separation supports more 
efficient routes in the metroplex environment [3, 4].  
Our Study 
In this study, we explore scheduling solutions to 
coordinate the demand of both arrival and departures 
over common waypoints in temporally shared 
airspace. We use the term "Sharing Of Airspace 
Resources" (SOAR) to describe the concept of 
efficient arrival and departure routes crossing each 
other and sharing a common airspace. 
We chose the NorCal TRACON environment as 
a specific example of a generic problem. 
Shared Airspace  
The San Francisco Bay area is a metroplex 
environment with three large airports within 20nm of 
each other. San Francisco International Airport (SFO) 
and Oakland International Airport (OAK) are on each 
side of the bay 10nm apart from each other. San Jose 
International Airport (SJC) is on the south of the bay, 
20nm apart from SFO and OAK. Today, departures 
from San Jose to the northeast fly the LOUPE1 
departure. Aircraft on this departure route fly a 360 
degree turn over the city at 12,000 feet and then head 
to the north above arrival traffic coming into Oakland 
and San Francisco from the southwest. This highly 
inefficient route is designed to avoid the Oakland and 
San Francisco arrival flows, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Routes and Sectors 
We adapted existing Standard Instrument 
Departures (SID) and Standard Terminal Arrival 
Routes (STAR) to create a new departure from SJC 
that flies directly to the northeast, called REDDT1. 
The REDDT1 departure is derived from the Sunol6 
departure for turboprops. The new REDDT1 route 
crosses the airspace of both arrival routes. The 
standard procedure is to fly this route safely under 
both arrival flows at 5,000 feet, i.e. to cross both the 
SKYLO and REDDT waypoints at 5,000ft. On the 
arrival routes, traffic is expected to cross SKYLO at 
7,000ft and REDDT at 6,000ft. The altitude 
restrictions at SKYLO and REDDT allow departures 
to fly the route safely in case of a loss of radio 
communication.  
Currently, the Madwin and Panoche STAR 
merge at the SUNOL waypoint. This waypoint is in 
class C airspace. Because the REDDT1 departures 
are flown only by jets, we moved that waypoint to the 
west into class B airspace and renamed it REDDT. 
Moving that point also created a better angle between 
the Modesto and REDDT1 routes to allow divergence 
between traffic flows.  
The REDDT1 departure provides two 
advantages over the LOUPE1 departure.  First, it is a 
shorter route. Second, the altitude restrictions at 
SKYLO and REDDT can be lifted provided there is 
an available gap in the arrival flows. Combined with 
a scheduling tool, the departures could be temporally 
separated from the arrivals and climb more 
efficiently. This was the main operational goal of the 
study. 
 
 
We did not create a sector around the Reddt1 
departure since the REDDT1 departure flies across 
the standard arrival sectors until it reaches 12,000ft or 
24nm out, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The 
REDDT1 first flies in the Mulford-Grove combined 
arrival sector. If the aircraft is level at SKYLO and 
REDDT, it will stay in the Mulford-Grove sector. If 
the altitude restriction is lifted before Reddt, the 
aircraft will climb and eventually enter the Niles 
arrival sector. Figure 2 shows the optimal REDDT1 
departure climb profile we used for B737-800 
aircraft. It shows how the three different climb 
profiles of the route penetrate the arrival sectors. The 
black line shows the safe route where aircraft fly 
under the arrival routes and stay in the Mulford-
Grove sector. The red line is the route of aircraft 
leveling at SKYLO and then climbing at or above 
REDDT, eventually entering the Niles sector. The 
blue line is the route of aircraft climbing 
continuously at or above both SKYLO and REDDT, 
also eventually entering the Niles sector. The 
departing REDDT1 B738 aircraft reach 5,000ft 
approximately 3nm before SKYLO, 4nm before 
leaving the Toga sector. The triangles indicate the 
expected altitudes of the departures (in white), the 
Modesto arrivals (in blue) and the Oakland arrivals 
(in brown). 
As can be seen, the REDDT1 departures climb 
across one or two arrival sectors for a brief period of 
time before entering a departure sector again. This 
creates a need to coordinate control of the aircraft, 
especially since they may no longer be spatially 
separated from the Oakland arrivals, which creates a 
need to separate the departures temporally from the 
arrivals. 
These needs for coordination are created by the 
interdependencies and uncertainties created in this 
shared airspace. Different traffic flows share the 
same airspace and cross the same fix. Also, the 
REDDT1 departures may cross the shared fix at 
different time and altitude. 
 
Figure 2. Possible Climb Profiles Across Sectors
Coordination  
The need to coordinate leads to two main 
questions.   First, who makes the decision to climb 
the departures and thus who is responsible for 
separating the REDDT1 departures from the arrivals?  
Second, how can the SJC tower schedule REDDT1 
departures to fly through gaps in the arrival flows in a 
timely manner? To answer these questions, we 
designed a coordination procedure to support the 
control of the departures, and we developed a 
scheduling tool to support the timing of departures 
from the tower.  
Coordination Procedures between Sectors 
The Mulford-Grove controller (henceforth called 
Mulford) decided whether to climb REDDT1 
departures to a higher altitude, and thus was 
 
 
responsible for separating them from arrivals. 
However, the Niles controller could veto the decision 
for an aircraft to enter Niles' sector. This coordination 
was done by point-out and was specified in a 
Standard Operating Procedure. 
Another problem was the limited time for 
Mulford to decide whether to climb departures. The 
departing REDDT1 departures would be on Toga’s 
SJC departure frequency until shortly before entering 
Mulford airspace at which time the aircraft would be 
at altitude level. So we developed another Standard 
Operating Procedure to coordinate between Mulford 
and Toga, giving an earlier control to Mulford.  
Both Standard Operating Procedures are further 
detailed in the Method sections. 
Temporal Coordination: Scheduling Arrivals and 
Crossing Departures  
Scheduling is the most efficient way to allocate 
the use of the same resource and thus reduce 
uncertainties in temporal demand. In our concept, 
both arrivals and departures were scheduled to cross 
REDDT, the common fix. Assumptions about 
arrivals and departures were different.  Arrivals flows 
have the most reliable time predictability. We used 
that as a known parameter to schedule departures. 
The arrival schedule allowed the creation of 
predictable gaps that would allow for unreliable 
departure times.  We used the Controller Managed 
Spacing (CMS) tools developed in the Airspace 
Operation Laboratory [5]  These tools work with a 
scheduler that gives a precise time for aircraft to meet 
at the runway threshold (Scheduled Time of Arrival, 
STA). The scheduler computes time from the meter 
fix at the boundary of the TRACON down to the 
runway. The main tool in the suite of CMS tools is 
the “slot marker.” Slot markers are circles that 
represent   where aircraft should be along its nominal 
route to meet its STA. When an aircraft is inside its 
slot marker, it is on time. Controllers can vector 
aircraft and use slot markers as a target. (CMS tools 
also include speed advisories and Early/Late 
indicators, which were not included in this 
simulation.) CMS tools are based on nominal routes, 
with expected altitudes and speeds on the procedures, 
and adjust for forecast winds. 
In our study, the STAs of arrival aircraft were 
frozen on the schedule to the runways, meaning that 
the arrivals were committed to a STA. Controllers 
were instructed to keep arrival traffic on their route 
and in their slot marker. The departure times, on the 
other hand, were not frozen but floating to allow for 
flexibility. Departures did not use slot markers. 
  We adapted the Departure Flow Management 
(DFM) system to schedule departures and to 
coordinate the crossing times with arrivals.  DFM 
allows an airport tower to schedule aircraft in 
available time slots [6]. The time slots reflect 
available times at a departure meter fix. Departure 
meter fixes are used to control flows into adjacent 
centers towards major destinations. In our study, the 
tower scheduled a REDDT1 departure based on the 
location of an aircraft on the runway departure 
timeline that matched a gap in the arrival flow. Gaps 
are excess spacing at the crossing fix propagated 
back onto the runway departure timeline, using a 
nominal flying time from the runway to the crossing 
fix. Gaps are comparable to time slots. Both gaps and 
time slots support the allocation and distribution of 
aircraft across time and space. However, gaps are 
reflective of the relative spacing between two arrivals 
and can be large at times. In our concept, gaps are 
controlled by the TRACON Traffic Management 
Unit. The TMU can decide to remove gaps or can set 
different buffer times between the gaps and the 
leading and trailing arrivals. The buffers provide a 
minimum separation with the leading or trailing 
aircraft with any aircraft inside the gap. We used 90 
seconds of buffer on the front and the back of gaps to 
allow for 3nm lateral separation. In the following 
example of runway timeline (Figure 3), gaps are 
indicated in dark blue. Callsigns are color-coded by 
departure routes: yellow for the LOUPE1, turquoise 
for the SanJose9, and magenta for the Reddt1. A 
Reddt1 departure scheduled to depart to meet a gap is 
expected to cross REDDT inside the actual gap 
between arrivals on the Oakland arrival flow.  
 
Figure 3. Timeline Display at SJC Tower 
 
 
Precise departures times are more difficult to 
predict than arrival times. Today, Call For Release 
(CFR) procedures give departures a -1min +2min 
departure time window. In addition, not all departures 
meet that time window. Such uncertainty leads to 
aircraft missing slots, increased delays and added 
workload for controllers [7, 8].  
Our scheduling concept allows for some 
flexibility in the departure time. For the tower, the 
gaps are not specific time slots, but rather a window 
of time when the tower can schedule departures 
depending on what is best for surface operations. 
Departures can be scheduled as soon as arrivals enter 
the TRACON and the STAs are known. This can be 
up to 20 minutes prior to departure. The DFM system 
eliminates the need for the tower to coordinate with 
the TRACON for a release time over the phone. To 
avoid unwanted departure times, the TRACON could 
require a conditional use of the gaps. This concept 
leverages the predictability of the arrival times and 
accommodates the uncertainty of departures times. It 
also minimizes the coordination process to releasing 
departures. 
Method 
We tested our concept in a high fidelity Human-
in-the-Loop simulation at the Airspace Operation 
Laboratory (AOL) using the Multi Aircraft Control 
System (MACS) software [9].  
Experiment Design 
The simulation was a 2x2x2 full factorial design. 
Each of the following were fully crossed: First Sector 
(Toga vs. Mulford), Tool Reliability (Reliable vs. 
Unreliable), and Gap (REDDT vs. SKYLO). 
First Sector 
In half of the runs, the first sector to control the 
REDDT1 departures was either Toga the departure 
sector or Mulford the next arrival sector. When Toga 
was the first sector, SJC Tower would request pilots 
to contact Toga’s frequency, who would then later 
transfer communication to Mulford. When Mulford 
was first, SJC Tower would request pilots to contact 
Mulford’s frequency directly. The consequence for 
Mulford was that it had control of the aircraft a few 
miles off its boundary or on contact just after the 
aircraft had taken off. We hypothesized that Mulford 
would have more time to coordinate with Niles and 
make a decision to climb when Mulford was the first 
sector, and climb performances would improve. 
Tool Reliability/Departure Accuracy 
In half of the runs, all the departures took off 
inside the predicted gap on the scheduler (Reliable 
Condition). In the other half of the runs, half of the 
departures took off outside of the predicted gap, and 
the other half inside the predicted gap (Unreliable 
Condition). The rationale for this manipulation was 
to test the impact of the precision of the tool on the 
controllers’ decisions to climb safely above the 
nominal route. In each run, 8 departures were 
scheduled by the tower confederate. There were 4 
positions of the departure time relative to the gap: 
60sec and 30sec inside a gap, or 60sec and 30sec 
outside of the gap, as shown in Figure 4. These 
positions were also relative to the front and to the 
back of a gap. This yielded a total of 8 different 
possibilities. The order of the 8 positions was 
counterbalanced so that each run had a different order 
and an equal distribution of each position for each 
run.  
 
Figure 4. Departure Accuracy Conditions 
The four relative positions of the departures 
provided additional opportunities for our analyses. 
They could be treated as more or less accurate 
departures (Departure Accuracy). In addition to 
studying the impact of tool precision then, is studying 
the impact of the actual position of the departure on 
the controllers’ decisions. We hypothesized that 
aircraft departing outside of the predicted gaps would 
 
 
be kept at level altitude until clear of arrival traffic 
more often than aircraft predicted to fly through gaps. 
Gaps at REDDT and SKYLO 
It became apparent in the first few runs that 
controllers were vectoring departures to separate 
them from arrival traffic at REDDT, but also at 
SKYLO. Controllers could then climb aircraft above 
the Modesto arrival flow, instead of keeping aircraft 
underneath it. REDDT1 departures then only 
occasionally crossed the REDDT waypoint where the 
gaps were. After repeating our 4 main conditions 2 
times (8 runs) with gaps at REDDT, we ran the 4 
conditions again with gaps at SKYLO (4 runs). 
The 12 runs with the associated experimental 
factors are listed in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
Run # Gap at First Sector Tool reliability 
1 REDDT Toga Reliable 
2 REDDT Toga Unreliable 
3 REDDT Mulford Unreliable 
4 REDDT Toga Reliable 
5 REDDT Mulford Unreliable 
6 REDDT Mulford Reliable 
7 REDDT Mulford Reliable 
8 REDDT Toga Unreliable 
9 SKYLO Mulford Reliable 
10 SKYLO Toga Reliable 
11 SKYLO Mulford Unreliable 
12 SKYLO Toga Unreliable 
 
Participants 
Five retired controllers with experience in 
TRACON airspace staffed five sectors. The two most 
recently retired controllers rotated through the Niles 
and Mulford positions. A third controller staffed 
Toga, the SJC departure sector.  A fourth staffed 
Sunol-Cedar, the SFO and OAK arrival combined 
feeder sectors. A fifth staffed Final, the final 
approach sector to SFO (called "Foster" at NCT). 
One researcher was a confederate and acted as a local 
controller at San Jose Tower. Six pseudo-pilots 
participated. Each pseudo-pilot was responsible for 
flying aircraft in a sector. All pilots were students 
from the Aviation department at San Jose State 
University. 
Traffic Scenario 
We developed two traffic scenarios derived from 
actual traffic data.  Both had similar attributes. 
Arrival traffic was for SFO and OAK and departures 
from SJC. Some overflight and Visual Flight Rules 
(VFR) traffic were included for realism. The 
Modesto arrival traffic rate met the maximum landing 
capacity for the SFO runway 28R. Both Oakland 
arrivals were populated with more traffic than today. 
Gaps occurred when excess spacing existed between 
arrivals. This occurred naturally in the Modesto flow. 
Large gaps occurred when Golden6 arrivals were 
scheduled to merge with the Modesto flow 
downstream of SKYLO. Large gaps were built into 
the Oakland arrival flow to allow for REDDT1 
departures to climb. Departure aircraft from SJC 
were scheduled to either depart on the LOUPE1 
departure or the SanJose9 departure. There were 12 
departures per run and 12 runs total. 
Apparatus  
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement 
System (STARS) screen displays were emulated on 
the MACS software. MACS provides a high fidelity 
environment to prototype the scheduling tools, to 
simulate the air traffic and to collect data [10].  
Two tools assisted controllers: J-rings and 
timelines. J-rings are circles around aircraft that can 
be set at any size. In this study the size was set to the 
minimum separation (3nm).   
Timelines depicted two relative positions of 
aircraft to a specific waypoint. One position showed 
an Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) and the other 
showed an STA of aircraft at the waypoint. MACS 
computes aircraft trajectories to determine ETAs, 
based on flight plans, altitude and speed constraints, 
and forecast winds. MACS then uses ground-based 
trajectory and scheduling criteria, such spacing 
values, to compute the STA. Slot markers follow the 
STA. An STA shows when aircraft should cross the 
waypoint. An ETA is when it is predicted to actually 
cross.  
There were different configurations of timelines: 
two timelines for the arrivals to OAK and SFO 
runways (OAK29 and SFO28R), and another 
timeline for the departure from SJC30L. In the case 
of the departure timeline, the time to the runway 
represented the time to takeoff. There was also a 
 
 
timeline to the crossing fix which depicted gaps and 
the departures’ ETA and arrivals’ ETA and STA to 
the cross point.  
Operational Procedure 
We developed operational procedures to 
schedules departures and for coordinating control of 
the departures between the arrival sectors. 
Scheduling Departures  
 In each scenario, departures out of SJC were 
filed to fly either the LOUPE1 departure to the 
northeast or the SJC9 departure to the south. The 
tower confederate acted as a cab coordinator who 
would coordinate with both the Clearance Delivery 
and the Local controller positions. The tower 
confederate looked at the departure timeline and 
checked which flight departure time would be likely 
to match a gap.  
We assumed that pilots would accept an 
amendment to the standard LOUPE1 departure to a 
REDDT1 departure 10-15 minutes prior to take off 
because the REDDT1 is a shorter route. At SJC, the 
aircraft is likely to be at the gate at this time. At a 
busy airport, pilots can expect to amend their 
departure even while waiting near the runway. We 
assumed the pilots would load a new departure in 
their Flight Management System (FMS). 
Once the pilots accepted the amendment, the 
controller inserted it in the ground system and 
assigned a new departure time, if that was necessary. 
We assumed that pilots would accept a few minutes 
of departure time delay since the flight time of 
REDDT1 departures is about 6 minutes shorter than 
that of the LOUPE1 departures. 
For each run, the tower confederate scheduled 
aircraft either inside or outside the gap according to 
which Departure Accuracy conditions they were in. 
We counter balanced both scenarios and the 
Departure Accuracy conditions, thus providing a 
unique combination for each departure. 
Controllers’ Coordination: Point-out and Handoff 
Once the departure took off, the tower 
confederate requested that the pilot contact the first 
sector, Toga or Mulford, depending on the 
experimental condition. The request took place when 
aircraft was between 500ft and 1,000ft off the 
ground. 
When radio contact was established with Toga 
first, Toga would immediately hand-off the datablock 
to Mulford. However, in this condition, the Standard 
Operating Procedure required Toga to wait until the 
REDDT1 aircraft reached 2000ft and was 1.8 DME 
from the SJC VOR to request that the pilots contact 
Mulford’s frequency. When radio contact was 
established with Mulford first, the Standard 
Operating Procedure allowed Mulford to have control 
of that aircraft on contact and to display its datablock 
to Toga. Any lateral deviation from the routes 
required further coordination with Toga. 
Once Mulford had control of the aircraft, s/he 
had to decide whether the REDDT1 departure 
altitude restriction could be lifted to allow the aircraft 
to climb through Niles airspace. If traffic appeared to 
permit this, Mulford pointed out the aircraft to Niles. 
If Niles approved the point-out, Mulford could clear 
the aircraft to 11,000 feet, the ceiling altitude of Niles 
sector, and could hand-off the datablock to Quake, a 
departure sector. If Niles or Mulford needed to vector 
the departure aircraft, verbal coordination was 
required. This point-out procedure was specified in a 
Standard Operating Procedure and read as follows: 
“Mulford has control for climb with a point out with 
Niles. A point out approval authorizes Mulford to 
climb departures through Niles' airspace. Lateral 
deviations from the route require further 
coordination.” Mulford also displayed the REDDT1 
departure to the Foster sector, so that Foster would 
not descend any arrival aircraft until past SKYLO. 
When lifting the altitude restrictions was not 
possible, Mulford did not point out to Niles and kept 
the aircraft at 5000 feet in Mulford's airspace. 
The recommended procedure was for Mulford to 
keep aircraft under the Modesto arrival flow, and 
then decide whether to climb REDDT1 departure 
aircraft based on the gaps in the Oakland arrival flow. 
Controller positions were dispersed across two 
control rooms. We allocated the positions in such a 
way that a neighboring airspace sector would be in a 
separate room. For instance, Mulford was separated 
from Toga and Niles. This was done to force 
controllers to use the point out tool and the voice 
communication system, and avoid face-to-face 
coordination. This also reflects the actual allocation 
 
 
of the sectors across different control areas at 
Northern California TRACON. 
Experimental Procedure 
We tested our concept and MACS emulation 
with the participants several times prior to the study. 
The study itself took place over four days. On the 
first day, we briefed controllers about their tasks and 
responsibilities, and particularly about the operational 
procedures. Then controllers trained during four 
practice runs with our four main conditions using 
separate scenarios from those used in the actual data 
collection runs. The following three days, controllers 
participated in twelve runs for data collection. 
Finally, a debrief discussion with controllers and 
pseudo pilots concluded the study. 
Controllers answered questions after each run 
online and at the end of the study on paper. The 
questions pertained to workload, acceptability, 
feasibility and safety of the operation and 
coordination.  
Results  
Twelve runs produced 96 departures flying in 
arrival airspace, 8 departures per run. Each departure 
was treated as a single case since its departure time 
and therefore its position relative to other aircraft was 
never the same. 
We analyzed data for coordination effort, climb 
efficiency, safety, and acceptability. We used time in 
seconds to measure the timing of action events, such 
as when point-outs or handoffs started and ended, and 
when the pilots were cleared to climb to 11,000 feet. 
We also used altitude to measure climb performance, 
as well as nautical miles to assess the loss of lateral 
separation.  
We begin by presenting analyses based on our 
original design: First Sector X Tool Reliability and 
First Sector X Departure Accuracy for the first 8 runs 
(N = 64) when the gaps were at REDDT. Then, we 
present analyses for runs with gaps at SKYLO (N = 
32) and finally, we present results comparing 
scheduling to gaps at REDDT and SKYLO. 
Coordination: First Sector and Point-Out 
Early coordination allowed controller to make 
decisions about the Reddt departures earlier across all 
runs. In the first 8 runs, when gaps were situated at 
REDDT, we found significant main effects of First 
Sector on the timing of point outs, as shown in Table 
2 below. Point outs started an average of 20 seconds 
earlier when the first sector to control departures was 
Mulford (M = 27.6 sec, SD = 18.2) than Toga (M = 
47.6 sec, SD = 22.4), F(1,60) = 14.9, p < .001). Table 
2 lists the mean time (Standard Deviations) in 
seconds from takeoff and aircraft altitude in feet 
when cleared to climb to 11000 feet as a function of 
First Sector. 
We also tested whether early coordination had 
an effect on the altitude aircraft were at when cleared 
to climb to 11000 feet. First Sector had a marginal 
main effect. Aircraft was at a lower altitude when 
Mulford was first (M = 4,184ft, SD = 1,250), than 
when Toga was (M = 4,632ft, SD 737), F(1,60) = 3.0, 
p = .09 (ns) as shown in Table 2. This marginal effect 
would become significant (p = .045, one-tail) if we 
initially assumed a unilateral directional effect of 
First Sector (Mulford over Toga). Time wise, aircraft 
seemed to be cleared to climb to 11,000 feet slightly 
earlier when Mulford was first (M = 138.0sec, SD = 
46.3) compared to Toga (M = 151.7sec, SD = 35.3). 
However no significant main effect was found, 
F(1,60) = 1.8, p = .18 (ns).  
Table 2. Point-Out and Aircraft Altitude 
     First Sector  
 Mulford M (SD) 
Toga 
M (SD) 
 
  F 
Gap at REDDT     
Point-out start time  
 
27.6 
(18.2) 
47.6 
(22.4) 
14.9** 
Aircraft altitude when 
cleared to 11,000 feet 
4,184 
(1250) 
4,632 
(737) 
3.0a 
Gap at SKYLO     
Point-out start time  
 
24.0 
(19.0) 
38.6 
(18.8) 
4.8* 
Aircraft altitude when 
cleared to 11,000 feet 
3,450 
(1,379) 
4,187 
(995) 
3.0a 
All runs (1-12)    
Point-out start time  
 
26.4 
(18.4) 
44.6 
(21.5) 
19.9** 
Aircraft altitude when 
cleared to 11,000 feet 
3,939 
(1,326) 
4,484 
(848) 
5.8* 
* p < .05, ** p < .01., a p =.09. 
The timing of point outs correlated with the time 
it took for the controller to clear aircraft to 11,000 
 
 
feet, as well as with the altitude of the aircraft at the 
time of the clearance. The later that point outs started, 
the later that clearances were given to 11,000 feet (r 
(64) = .29, p < .05) and the higher altitude of the 
aircraft (r (64) = .28, p < .05). 
In the last four runs, when gaps were at SKYLO, 
the results were similar. Point outs started earlier 
when the first sector was Mulford (M = 24 sec, SD = 
19) instead of Toga (M = 38.6 sec, SD = 18.8), 
F(1,30) = 4.8, p= < .05, as shown in Table 2. Also, 
First Sector had a marginal effect on when aircraft 
were cleared to climb to 11,000ft. Aircraft were at a 
lower altitude when the first sector was Mulford (M = 
3,450 ft, SD = 1,379), compared to Toga (M = 4,187 
ft, SD = 995), F(1,30) = 3.0, p = .09 (ns). This 
marginal effect would also become significant (p = 
.045) if we assumed a unilateral directional effect of 
First Sector (Mulford over Toga). 
When we considered the 12 runs together, the 
First Sector had a significant main effect on when 
aircraft were cleared to 11,000 feet, F(1,94) = 5.8, p 
= .02, as shown in Table 2. Departures were at lower 
altitude when Mulford was first (M = 3939 ft, SD = 
1326) compared to Toga (M = 4484 ft, SD = 848). 
Also, point outs started earlier when the first sector 
was Mulford (M = 26.4 sec, SD = 18.4) instead of 
Toga (M = 44.6 sec, SD = 21.5; F(1,94) = 19.9, p = 
.000). These results indicate that the aircraft climb 
performance benefitted from arrival controllers 
having control of the aircraft immediately after 
takeoff. 
As expected, the First Sector condition was 
independent of the Tool Reliability/Departure 
Accuracy condition. Surprisingly, we did not find any 
Tool Reliability/Departure Accuracy effect on the 
altitude or the time aircraft were cleared to climb to 
11,000 feet for the first 8 runs, when the gaps were at 
REDDT. Two explanations are possible.  First, 
controllers tactically tried to climb departures 
through gaps in the Modesto traffic at SKYLO. If 
successful, this helped to achieve a vertical 
separation with arrival traffic at REDDT, making 
traffic at REDDT no longer a constraint. Second, 
controllers vectored a large proportion (44%) of 
departures a few nautical miles to the left of the 
REDDT waypoint where they could fly above the 
arrival traffic, making these aircraft independent of 
arrival traffic and any gaps at REDDT. We describe 
this further in the decision analysis below. We then 
present significant differences between the runs with 
gaps at REDDT versus gaps at SKYLO. 
Controllers’ Decision Analysis 
Figure 5 depicts the decisions controllers made 
for the REDDT1 departures when the gaps were at 
REDDT (left) for the first 8 runs, and at SKYLO 
(right) for the last 4 runs. Working from the left of 
Figure 5, the Mulford controller's first decision was 
either to leave a REDDT1 departure on its route or to 
vector it.  In either case, the second decision involved 
looking for natural gaps in the SKYLO flow and 
deciding whether to keep the aircraft level or to climb 
it at or before SKYLO.  This process was repeated 
for possible gaps in traffic at REDDT. 
In the first 8 runs (depicted on the left of Figure 
5), controllers climbed 100% (64) of the aircraft 
before REDDT. They vectored 44% (28/64) of 
aircraft before SKYLO. Of the vectored aircraft, 46% 
(13/28) stayed level until they passed SKYLO and 
then climbed before crossing the Oakland arrivals 
(west of REDDT). Of the 56% (36/64) of aircraft 
staying on their route, 44% (16/36) climbed before 
SKYLO, and continued to climb at REDDT. The 
remaining 20 aircraft leveled at SKYLO, and then 
continued to climb before REDDT. Of all the 
departures with the gap at REDDT, 48% (31/64) 
climbed before SKYLO and continued to climb 
before REDDT. The remaining 51% (33/64) leveled 
before SKYLO, and then climbed before REDDT.  
 
Figure 5. Decision Tree 
In the last 4 runs, only 13% (4/32) of aircraft 
were vectored. These 4 aircraft were climbed before 
SKYLO and continued to climb before crossing the 
Oakland arrivals (west of REDDT). Of the remaining 
 
 
87% (28/32) aircraft that stayed on their route, 71% 
(20/32) of aircraft were climbed before SKYLO, and 
continue to climb before REDDT. The remaining 8 
aircraft were leveled at SKYLO. Of those 8 aircraft, 6 
were then climbed before REDDT. Only 2 aircraft 
were kept level at SKYLO and REDDT.  
Controllers gradually favored vectoring 
departures over keeping them on their route during 
the first 8 runs (χ2 (7, N = 64) = 18.3, p = .011).  A 
Somers’ d test showed vectoring was dependent on 
the order of the runs (t (7, N = 64) = .397, p = .004, d 
= .397). In Run 1, 25% of the aircraft were vectored, 
in Run 6, 7 and 8, 75% of the aircraft were vectored. 
In the last 4 runs (9-12), controllers kept all but 4 
aircraft on the route. According to the controllers, it 
was simpler to leave an aircraft on its route if it was 
scheduled to fit in the gap on the Modesto flow. This 
was not possible in the first 8 runs.  
Climb Profiles 
Overall, in the first 8 runs, controllers climbed 
aircraft before REDDT, whether they leveled aircraft 
at 5,000 feet under the Modesto flow, or not. Table 3 
shows the average altitude of aircraft for each 
decision. Aircraft that leveled under the Modesto 
flow and climbed after that crossed the Oakland flow 
on average at 8,748 feet. The arrival traffic crossed 
REDDT at 6,000 feet. The departures were well 
above the arrival traffic by the time they crossed the 
Oakland arrival flow1. 
Controllers climbed aircraft before REDDT 
regardless of whether the aircraft was scheduled to 
fly inside a gap or not. Departure Accuracy did not 
have a main effect on the altitude of aircraft when it 
crossed REDDT or the arrival route (60sec in (M = 
9,567ft), 30sec in (M = 9,946ft), 30sec out (M = 
10,113ft), 60sec out (M = 9,888ft), F(3,60) = 0.4, p = 
ns). The result was similar for aircraft that stayed on 
the route (N = 36). Also climbing or leveling at 
SKYLO did have a significant effect on the altitude 
crossing REDDT. Aircraft crossed REDDT at a 
higher altitude when they were already climbing at 
SKYLO (M = 10,850ft, SD = 555), than when they 
were leveling at SKYLO (M = 8210ft, SD = 910), 
F(1,34) = 103.5, p = .000. This result suggests that 
leveling at SKYLO allowed departures to top arrival 
traffic at REDDT with enough vertical clearance. All 
                                                      
1 The climb rate used for B738 in our simulation was optimal. 
aircraft ended up climbing well above the Oakland 
traffic at REDDT. 
Table 3. Altitude at Crossing Fixes 
Gap at REDDT 
Decisions  SKYLO REDDT 
vector climb climb 6726 11066 
vector level climb 5008 9577 
vector level level N/A N/A 
route climb climb 7712 10850 
route level climb 5010 8210 
route level level N/A  N/A  
Gap at SKYLO 
Decisions  SKYLO REDDT 
vector climb climb 6780 11000 
vector level climb . . 
vector level level . . 
route climb climb 8432 11036 
route level climb 5000 7867 
route level level 5000 5000 
 
Controllers climbed aircraft before REDDT 
regardless of whether the aircraft was scheduled to 
fly inside a gap or not. Departure Accuracy did not 
have a main effect on the altitude of aircraft when it 
crossed REDDT or the arrival route (60sec in (M = 
9,567ft), 30sec in (M = 9,946ft), 30sec out (M = 
10,113ft), 60sec out (M = 9,888ft), F(3,60) = 0.4, p = 
ns). The result was similar for aircraft that stayed on 
the route (N = 36). Also climbing or leveling at 
SKYLO did have a significant effect on the altitude 
crossing REDDT. Aircraft crossed REDDT at a 
higher altitude when they were already climbing at 
SKYLO (M = 10,850ft, SD = 555), than when they 
were leveling at SKYLO (M = 8210ft, SD = 910), 
F(1,34) = 103.5, p = .000. This result suggests that 
leveling at SKYLO allowed departures to top arrival 
traffic at REDDT with enough vertical clearance. All 
aircraft ended up climbing well above the Oakland 
traffic at REDDT. 
In comparison, Departure Accuracy significantly 
influenced the aircraft altitude at SKYLO when 
departures were planned to cross gaps there. Table 4 
shows the means of altitude and Standard Deviations 
of aircraft crossing SKYLO as a function of 
Departure Accuracy. The breakdown of the 4 
accuracy conditions indicates that the relative 
 
 
position influences how early the aircraft is climbed. 
This suggests controllers could not climb aircraft 
before SKYLO due to a lack of lateral separation. 
There is a main effect of departure accuracy on the 
altitude of aircraft crossing SKYLO, F(3,23) = 14.3, 
p = .000. The more inside the gap the departure, the 
higher the altitude the aircraft crosses SKYLO. A 
departure scheduled 60 seconds outside a gap was 
only 30 seconds away from an arrival aircraft. In this 
case, aircraft were leveled at 5000 feet to maintain 
vertical separation. In contrast, aircraft scheduled 30 
seconds or 60 seconds inside the gaps were, 
respectively, 120 and 150 seconds away from arrival 
aircraft, and thus could be climbed. Departures inside 
the gaps show the highest altitudes (8,009ft vs. 
8,850ft, as shown in Table 4). 
Table 4. Altitude at SKYLO by Accuracy 
  Altitude at SKYLO 
   M SD 
Scheduled 
60sec inside gap 8850 926 
30sec inside gap 8009 1624 
30sec outside gap 5325 395 
60sec outside gap 5000 0 
 
The aircraft altitudes at SKYLO result from the 
main effect of departure accuracy on the time and the 
altitude of when the aircraft was cleared to climb to 
11,000 feet (see Figure 6 & 7).  
We compared the Departure Accuracy condition 
on the gaps at REDDT and SKYLO. We found a 
significant interaction effect on the time and altitude 
of the aircraft when it is cleared to 11,000 feet (See 
Figure 6 and 7). For comparison purpose, we used 
aircraft that were not vectored (N = 63). Figure 6 and 
7 show the means of altitude and time, respectively, 
when departures were cleared to climb to 11,000 feet 
as a function of gaps at SKYLO and REDDT and 
Departure Accuracy condition.  
Departure Accuracy did have a different impact 
on aircraft altitude (Figure 6) and time (Figure 7) 
between gaps at SKYLO and REDDT (F(3,55) = 5.2, 
p < .01 and F(3,55) = 6.6, p = .001, respectively). No 
main effects of gap or departure accuracy were found 
for altitude or time. However, when gaps were tested 
separately, Departure Accuracy had a significant 
main effect on altitude for gaps at SKYLO (F(3,23) = 
4.8, p = .01), but not REDDT (F(3,32) = 1.3, p ns). 
Departure Accuracy also had a significant main effect 
on time when gaps at situated at SKYLO (F(3,23) = 
9.0, p = .000), but not at REDDT (F(3,32) = 1.0, p 
ns).  
 
Figure 6. Altitude by Gaps and Accuracy 
 
Figure 7. Time by Gaps and Accuracy 
When gaps were situated at SKYLO, the more 
departures were predicted to fly inside the gaps, the 
earlier departures were cleared and the lower altitude 
they were. Departures scheduled 60 seconds inside 
the gaps were cleared at 3,136 feet and 98 seconds 
after takeoff. Departures scheduled 30 seconds inside 
the gaps were cleared a little higher (3,829ft), and 
approximately 30 seconds later (124sec after take-
off). Departures scheduled 30 or 60 seconds outside 
the gaps were leveled at around 5,000 feet when they 
were cleared around 3 minutes (176sec & 199sec 
respectively) after takeoff. 
When gaps were situated at REDDT, time and 
altitude did not differ significantly. Altitudes seemed 
to follow an inverse pattern. Departures seemed to be 
cleared to climb at a lower altitude (3,604ft) and 
 
 
earlier than for aircraft scheduled inside the gaps 
when departures were scheduled 60 seconds outside 
the gap. It is possible controllers were trying to climb 
early to top the arrival traffic at REDDT. Overall 
departures were cleared to climb before they reached 
5,000 feet. 
These results show that gaps in the first arrival 
flow were used opportunistically to climb aircraft 
above the second arrival flow. But when gaps were 
scheduled at the first arrival flow, scheduling aircraft 
inside gaps had a significant impact on the 
departures’ climb profile. 
Safety 
Often, controllers opted to climb through gaps at 
SKYLO and climb departures above the arrivals at 
REDDT, instead of keeping departures under the 
Modesto flow and climbing them through gaps at 
REDDT. They also vectored departures to avoid 
arrival traffic at REDDT. Were those decisions safe? 
Aircraft in the TRACON airspace need at least 
1,000 feet vertical separation and 3 nautical miles 
lateral separation. This rule applies as long as aircraft 
are on converging trajectories. Once one aircraft has 
crossed in front or behind of another aircraft, its 
trajectory is diverging, and the minimum separation 
requirement no longer applies. 
We measured the distance of arrival aircraft 
relative to the departure aircraft when it crossed the 
Modesto flow (at or near SKYLO) and also when it 
crossed the Oakland arrival flow (at or near REDDT) 
for each type of decision the controller made for the 
departures as shown in Table 5. This table shows the 
number of arrival aircraft for a relative distance. 
Minus numbers are distances of arrivals that have 
passed in front of the departures, and thus are 
laterally diverging from departures. The positive 
numbers are distances of arrivals that are converging. 
Letters a) through f) correspond to the possible states 
of departures in regards to the Modesto arrivals (a to 
d) and the Oakland arrivals (e & f). 
Table 5. Lateral Separation 
  Distance in nm of arrival aircraft to departure aircraft 
State of REDDT1 Departure 
-
10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12+ 
Crossing Modesto flow (SKYLO)                         
a) Route / Level       1 4 8 3 4 4 1 3   
b) Vectored / Level       1   2 3 2 4 1    
c) Route / Climbing          2     1 1 3 7 22 
d) Vectored / Climbing               3 5 3 9 
Crossing Oakland flow (REDDT)                          
e) Vectored / Climbing                 3 5 3 10 
f) Climbing (after level under Modesto) 26 2 6 4 2 0 2 3 1 6 8 22 
 
In a) departures were leveled and stayed on their 
leveled route. Eleven arrival aircraft were less than 4 
miles away (0, 2) from SKYLO. In this case, 
climbing the departures would have caused a loss of 
separation. In b) departures were leveled but were 
vectored to the left of their route at SKYLO. Five 
arrival aircraft were within -/+4 miles of the 
departures (-4, -2, 0, 2, 4). Two arrival aircraft were 
less than 3 miles away. As with letter a), departures 
could not be climbed due to traffic. In c) departures 
were on their route but were climbed before crossing 
SKYLO. In this case, no aircraft should be found less 
than 4 miles of SKYLO. There were 2 arrival aircraft 
that were within 2 miles but they had past SKYLO, 
i.e., were diverging. In d) departures were vectored 
and climbing. No traffic was within 4 miles of the 
departures.  In e) no arrival aircraft was found within 
4 miles of the departures. In f) departures had leveled 
at SKYLO and then were climbed before REDDT. 
This requires that there be no traffic at REDDT 
within a 3nm lateral distance or that departures are 
cleared vertically to top arrivals. There were at least 6 
arrival aircraft that were within 3nm of the 
departures. The departures flew above the arrivals. 
However, given the short distance from the Modesto 
flow and the Oakland flow (4 nm), these departures 
 
 
often came close to the minimum lateral separation 
while being still within 1000ft of vertical clearance. 
These 6 departures should have been kept at a level 
altitude to fly under the arrival flow. In one instance, 
a departure came close to losing separation.  
Overall, controllers were able to tactically vector 
and climb aircraft. Controllers tried to climb 
departures early and had to vector them to keep away 
from arrivals. This was a safe maneuver. However, 
most of the time, controllers kept departures on their 
trajectory and cleared them to climb. This decision is 
safe if aircraft can climb prior to SKYLO. Otherwise, 
departures could risk losing minimum separation.  
Workload and Acceptability 
Controllers responded to an online survey at the 
end of each run and a post-sim survey at the end of 
the simulation. Answers were either binary (yes/no), 
or were scored on a 5-point Likert rating scale, 
ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). Space was 
made available for comments. The post-run data was 
analyzed with repeated measures ANOVAs. 
Post-Run Survey Results 
No main effect of First Sector and Tool 
Reliability were found in the survey responses. 
Across all runs, the Mulford controller reported 
a higher mental activity during the busiest time 
(between “moderate” & “somewhat high”, M = 3.3, 
SD = 1.0) compared to the other controllers (between 
“very low” & “somewhat low”, M = 1.7, SD = .4), 
F(1,11) = 31.6, p <.001. Mulford also reported a 
higher time pressure (“moderate”, M = 2.9, SD = 0.7) 
than other sectors (between “very low” & “somewhat 
low”, M = 1.3, SD = 0.2) at the busiest time, F(1,11) 
= 76.5, p <.001. The Mulford controller also reported 
being less able to maintain adequate separation 
(“somewhat high” M = 3.9, SD = 1.2) than other 
controllers (“very high”, M = 4.7, SD = 0.3; F(1,11) 
= 4.7, p = .05). 
Although Final and Niles gave a maximum score 
of 5, or "Very acceptable," to all questions about the 
acceptability of allowing the REDDT1 departure 
through the arrival airspace in regard to workload, 
coordination and safety in the previous run, 
REDDT1Mulford’s answer was in between 
“Somewhat acceptable” and “Very acceptable”, M = 
4 (SD = 1.1) for workload, M = 4.2 (SD = 0.9) for 
coordination, and M = 4 (SD = 1.2) for safety 
(F(2,22) = 9.4 for workload, 9.2 for coordination, 8.3 
for safety, p < .01 for all). 
One controller stated twice that “Had Mulford 
been in communication with the REDDT departure in 
a more timely fashion, it could have been turned and 
climbed more efficiently.” This comment was made 
after the case of the near loss of separation, when 
Toga was the first sector to control the departures. 
The Mulford controller thought the coordination 
was cumbersome at times. Mulford used point outs 
during every run, and engaged in additional verbal 
coordination during 10/12 runs. Mulford initiated the 
point out coordination with other sectors, whereas the 
other sectors only responded to Mulford’s requests, 
sometimes after a delay. The time pressure was 
therefore on Mulford’s shoulders. Mulford reported 
having time pressure on at least one coordination in 
each run on 33% (4/12) of the runs; Niles and Final 
reported none. Mulford indicated that at times he had 
to wait for other sectors to accept point-outs, 
qualifying these as “late point-out”. Typical 
comments were "Had to wait on Niles to accept point 
out when I would have liked to start the aircraft 
climbing (Run 1) and "Needed to call Niles to get 
him to accept point out" (Run 11). Although the 
Mulford controller considered coordination as being 
accomplished in a timely fashion in 10/12 runs, in the 
other two runs he did not. Final and Niles sectors 
accepted point-outs while referencing other aircraft, 
in 25% and 20% of the runs, respectively, which was 
thought not to be enough by Mulford, as will be seen 
from the post-simulation survey results.  
Post-Simulation Survey Results 
These results confirmed the finding that having 
"Mulford first" worked better operationally and "in 
this simulation" was acceptable in terms of workload 
safety, and coordination than having direct departures 
go through Toga first. However, the two Mulford 
controllers thought the SOAR procedure would be 
only "somewhat acceptable" or less in the field.  One 
gave a rating of 3 or "somewhat acceptable," the 
other a rating of 2 to the question, "To the best of 
your knowledge, how acceptable would SOAR 
operations be in the field (i.e., with SJC Tower and 
NCT)?" Finally, the Mulford controllers felt that 
there should have been more referencing of other 
traffic in the point outs, each stating that over 7 times 
in the simulation there was other traffic that should 
 
 
have been pointed out before a point out was 
accepted.    
Communication Analysis Results 
According to the procedure, a point out assumed 
that aircraft would stay on its route. Mulford had to 
call other sectors if additional coordination was 
needed, such as vectoring the departure. Since 
Mulford opted to vector many aircraft, controllers 
came up with their own convention to reduce verbal 
coordination. During the first 5 runs, Mulford 
controller called Niles controller each time he 
intended to vector a departure. Quickly, requests 
became minimal (Run 4, Mulford to Niles: “Point-out 
[callsign] about to go northbound with him”, Niles: 
“Approved, [initials]”). In the 6th run, Mulford asked 
to obtain control for climb and turn for all the Reddt 
departures:  
Niles: “Niles.”   
Mulford: “Yeah [name] can I have control for 
these Reddt guys west of the routing and climb as 
well.”   
Niles: “Yes you can.”  
Mulford: “Thank you sir.”   
Niles: “[initials].”   
After that, for each run Mulford would contact 
Niles and set the same pre-arranged coordination 
procedure for the remaining departures of that run. 
Overall, verbal coordination decreased across the 
runs, from 12 exchanges in the first 4 runs, down to 7 
in the second 4 runs, to 6 in the third 4 runs, to 5 in 
the last 4 runs. Verbal coordination became 
exceptions to the pre-arranged coordination. 
Controllers were trying to minimize their 
coordination effort by establishing rules that do not 
require verbal repetitions. Such ad-hoc rule-making is 
a strategy commonly used by people to minimize 
their effort to understand each other [11]. 
Discussion 
Arrival and departure airspaces in metroplex 
environments are usually independent. Routes are 
segregated and can be suboptimal. Arrival and 
departures flows could be better integrated with more 
precise scheduling capabilities. We presented a more 
optimal departure route from SJC flying across 
arrival sectors in the San Francisco metroplex. 
Departures were scheduled at the runway to cross 
gaps in arrival flows. We manipulated the sector 
which controlled the departure after takeoff, as well 
as the schedule accuracy of the departures. Results 
show that the earlier the arrival controller could 
coordinate the departure aircraft with other sectors, 
the earlier the departures could climb to higher 
altitude and thus climb in a more efficient way. 
Controllers reported that time pressure was an 
important factor for the coordination and the control 
of the departure aircraft. Controllers preferred 
Mulford, the arrival sector, to control the departure 
first rather than Toga, the departure sector. An early 
control of the aircraft gave the arrival sector more 
time to make a decision and improved climb 
performance.  
Departures were scheduled to cross gaps at 
REDDT in the second arrival flow (Oakland arrivals) 
they were crossing. The first flow (Modesto arrivals) 
was to be crossed below at SKYLO. However 
controllers crossed both flows opportunistically and 
took advantage of natural gaps in the first flow to 
climb aircraft before they had to level off at 5000 
feet. For the first 8 runs departures were scheduled to 
cross gaps in the second arrival flow, and for the last 
4 runs, they were scheduled to cross gaps in the first 
arrival flow. Results showed that during the first 8 
runs controllers climbed all the departures before 
crossing the second flow regardless of the precision 
of the departures, instead taking advantage of an 
early climb to top arrivals. They also vectored 
departures to avoid separation loss. In the last 4 runs 
the scheduling tool did become relevant to support 
the controllers’ decision to climb aircraft early. When 
departures were mistimed and were going to miss the 
predicted gap, controllers kept them at level altitude. 
When the departures were on time and were going to 
fly through predicted gap they could be climbed 
early. The results showed that the more accurate 
departures were, the earlier aircraft were climbed and 
the higher their altitude when crossing the second 
arrival flow.  
Controllers overall rated the departure procedure 
as safe and acceptable within the simulation, but 
Mulford controllers rated the procedure as only 
"somewhat acceptable" or less in the field. Time 
pressure and mental activity was reported as high on 
occasions. The Mulford controllers, who had the 
responsibility to climb departures, reported that point 
outs could take longer than expected. During the 
second half of the simulation, the Mulford controller 
 
 
would ask the Niles controller permission to climb 
and turn aircraft for all departures at the beginning of 
each run. This pre-arranged coordination became a 
procedure for all REDDT1 departures. 
Although workload, coordination, and safety 
were judged by controllers as acceptable in the 
simulation, it appears that in the field, controllers will 
need both improved tools and coordination 
procedures to support SOAR procedures. Decision 
support tools and pre-arranged coordination 
procedures are explored in follow-up studies. 
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